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ABSTRACT
Five arguments are presented in favour of the proposal
that people who opt in as organ donors should receive
a tax break. These arguments appeal to welfare,
autonomy, fairness, distributive justice and self-
ownership, respectively. Eight worries about the proposal
are considered in this paper. These objections focus
upon no-effect and counter-productiveness, the Titmuss
concern about social meaning, exploitation of the poor,
commodification, inequality and unequal status, the
notion that there are better alternatives, unacceptable
expense, and concerns about the veto of relatives. The
paper argues that none of the objections to the proposal
is very telling.
The shortage of organs for transplant has a serious,
negative impact on a very large number of people
worldwide. In the USA alone at least 6000 patients
die each year while on waiting lists for new
organsda rough equivalent of twice the number of
people killed in the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001.1 2
The ﬁgures are comparable in many western
countries. In the UK, for instance, the number of
deaths due to organ shortage is approximately 1000
each year.3 What is even more serious is that the
number of people dying before they are assigned
a place on a waiting list is even greater than the
number of people dying while on the list. There-
fore, in the USA more than 100 000 possible
transplant candidates die each year before being
placed on a waiting list.4 We must add to this the
following facts: (1) Most of the waiting lists are
very long; studies show that the number of people
on the waiting list for an organ transplant in the
USA is approximately 112 000.5 (2) The time spent
on the waiting list (or before one is assigned) is
often terrifying and full of worry both for the
potential donee and his or her friends and family,
and the time people are on the waiting list is
increasing.6 (3) There is strong evidence that the
gap between supply and demand will increase,
because more people are living longer and getting
diabetes, and are thus becoming prone to organ
failure.7 This is an avoidable tragedy. We should
ﬁgure out a way of preventing it.
The shortage of organs is especially severe in
countries such as the USA, the UK and Denmark,
where donors are required to opt in, generally on
the basis of ‘informed consent’. In such countries
people can sign up to disclose their willingness to
donate their organs. On average approximately 15%
of people have stated whether or not they are
willing to donate, and only half of these have
declared that they are indeed willing to donate.8
Elsewhere in the developed worlddfor example, in
Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Poland and
Portugaldan opt-out system of ‘presumed consent’
operates, according to which people are automati-
cally treated as donors but can opt out whenever
they want. Here the number of ‘registered’ donors
is much higher, at approximately 98e99.8%.9 The
obvious conclusion is that the contrasting
percentages here reﬂect differing ‘capture rates’d
when it comes to registered donorsdunder the
opt-in and opt-out systems.
Few would dispute that arrangements involving
presumed consent require justiﬁcation in a way
that their counterparts with informed, actual
consent do not. And presumably nobody in their
right mind would deny that capture rates are
important. The question we therefore wish to
address is whether it is possible to devise an opt-in
system that is better suited than the one currently
operating in the USA, the UK and Denmark to
increase human organ supply. One idea has already
been tried. In 2010, Israel implemented a broadly
reciprocal opting-in system, in which, if you sign
up and demonstrate your willingness to donate,
you receive priority if it subsequently turns out
that you need an organ. Like the Israeli govern-
ment, we anticipate that this system will make
more organs available, simply as a result of moti-
vating more people to become donors.10 However,
because the initiative is very young, we have been
unable to obtain data verifying this conjecture.11
One can imagine a more stringently recip-
rocaldsupply as well as demand-sidedopting-in
system in which one signs up not only to donate
one’s organs, but also to receive another ’s should
the need arise, possibly on the very same form.
Such a system is more stringent because, presum-
ably, most people would feel some inhibition in
ticking the box indicating ‘I’d like to receive
someone else’s organs should I need to’ while not
ticking the box for ‘I will donate my own organs
should someone else need them’ and if they do so
despite this inhibition, they will get the lower
priority they presently get under the Israeli system.
A stringently reciprocal opting-in system of this
sort, like the somewhat less stringent arrangements
operating in Israel, would, we believe, be likely to
make more organs available for transplantation
than conventional systems with a simple opting-in
structure.
For various reasonsdsome, in the ﬁrst instance,
at any rate, politicaldopting-out systems, the
Israeli variant of opting-in and demand-side opting-
in systems are not always feasible. In what follows
we will largely set aside both conventional opting-
out and reciprocal opting-in systems and focus on
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a proposal that might yet ensure that more people in opt-in
countries currently showing little appetite for arrangements
relying on presumed consent will opt in. In principle our
proposal can be accommodated within either an opting-out or
an opting-in model. Plainly, though, its main value lies with the
latter, and that is what we will be concentrating upon. In the
case of the former model, it might well be thought unnecessary
to raise capture rates above 98e99.8%.
A PROPOSAL: TAX BREAKS
Many suggestions as to how organ supply could be improved
through ﬁnancial incentives have been made, and a good number
of these have been discussed at length in the medical ethics
literature. Different kinds of markets in human body parts are
critically discussed in Taylor12 and Blumstein et al13 for example,
and the ethical concerns raised by reimbursement for the funeral
services of deceased donors are discussed in Delmonico et al.2 In
what follows, we would like to elaborate, and critically discuss,
a relatively overlooked idea: namely, that a tax beneﬁt should be
used to incentivise donation. In principle, there are two general
approaches here: one is to impose extra tax on people who
decide not to opt in, the other is to offer a tax break of some sort
to people who agree to opt in. Albeit economically equivalent,
these approaches are likely to be perceived rather differently. For
example, the former, unlike the latter, might be thought to
involve the assertion of some kind of public ownership over
citizens’ bodily parts, but in economic terms they are equiva-
lent.14 It seems likely that, politically, the second approach
would be more workable. Accordingly, this is the one we will
explore.
Depending on the generosity of the scheme, a tax beneﬁt
scheme would work in one or both of two ways. Its primary
effect would be to compensate people for the negative impacts
associated with making a donation. Quite what those impacts
are would need to be investigated empirically, but judging by the
number of people who think they should donate but do not do
so, it seems undeniable that, in some sense, costs do attach to
organ donation. Secondarily, the scheme would deliver a positive
incentive to donors, or their relatives, to go through with
donations and in that way it would increase the number of
organs available for transplantation. Brieﬂy, the difference
between these two effects is this: compensation means that
people are not made worse off by making their organs available;
incentives mean they are made better off.
At least three tax beneﬁt schemes are available here. One is
that a person receives an annual tax credit (say, £200) in exchange
for consenting to be an organ donor on his or her death.15 In
a variant of this arrangement the donor could receive a much
larger, one-off tax credit the year he or she signs the form
consenting to donation. In both of these cases donors may be able
to opt out should they change their mind, provided they pay
back the taxes saved. A second tax-based incentive would be that
your relative (or some other recipient such as a nominated
charity) receives a tax credit on condition that you are signed up
as a donor and that your organs actually are transplanted after
your death. A third possibility would be for you to receive a tax
credit when, as a living donor, you donate an organ, such as your
kidney, or a lung or part of your liver, that you can manage
without.5 16 A form of this third option has been adopted in the
USA state of Wisconsin, which in 2004 passed a law that allows
donors to deduct from their taxable income any costs they incur
as the result of donating part of a liver or a kidney. A maximum
deduction of US$10000 is allowed, and a one-off payment is
made. When a live donor makes a kidney available for trans-
plantation the sum needed for compensation will obviously be
quite signiﬁcant, probably well above US$10000. The ﬁrst two
schemes could be combined; they could also be extended to live
donors, as they are in effect in Wisconsin. However, the following
discussion will focus on the ethics of the ﬁrst schemedie, the
scheme in which a person receives a tax credit when he or she
agrees to become an organ donor on his or her death. The
reasonable question of whether our proposals would be illegal is
beyond the scope of this paper. We merely note in passing that
there is a clear sense in which illegality is not in itself a powerful
objection; it may be that the law needs updating.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR TAX CREDITS
Provided the alternative is an opt-in scheme with no reward or
compensation for donation, several arguments support the
suggestion that people who donate their organs should receive
a tax credit. These arguments appeal to a wide range of ethical
principles, some of which may be in conﬂict with one another.
For the present purposes, though, any potential argumentative
disharmony is not a problem. Our aim is to show that strong
reasons favour our proposal whichever of a broad range of
ethical principles you subscribe to. We are not endorsing the
arguments sketched in this section collectively.
The most obvious argument is welfare based: it is that a tax
credit scheme would increase the size of the pool of organs
available for transplantation. Although economic incentives do
not always work as intended, studies show that they often
work.13 Studies have demonstrated, for instance, that people
actually donate more to charity the more of the donations they
are able to deduct from their taxes.17 If incentives work in the
same way in the case of organ transplantation, a lot of lives
would probably be saved. In any case, the best way to ﬁnd out
how incentives affect the number of donors is by actually
implementing the scheme and seeing what happens. If there are
no, or only weak, objections to the scheme, a small probability
of increasing the number of available organs may sufﬁce to
justify the introduction of the scheme as a temporary measure
whose continuation depends on a subsequent positive evalua-
tion. We take it for granted that nearly all participants in the
debatedconsequentialists and most deontologistsdwill regard
the fact that it will save lives as a strong reason to adopt our
proposal, even if they are doubtful about the mechanism itself.
Furthermore, if everything else is equal, increasing the number of
organs available for transplantation could shorten (or eliminate)
waiting lists, shorten waiting times, and thereby improve
wellbeing for many people. If one sees ‘transplant tourism’ (or
organ theft) as a morally bad thing, an increase in the number of
organs for transplantation in rich countries, brought about by
a tax credit for willingness to donate, will minimise, or eliminate
altogether, such tourism (or theft).
Second, a tax credit might nudge people to do what they
really want to do. Several studies conducted in various countries
indicate that approximately 80% of the population wants to
donate organs,18 19 but in countries with an opting-in system
many people fail to do what, apparently, they really want to do.
The reasons for this include complacency, lack of knowledge
about the options or the procedure, and the simple fact that
most of us ﬁnd it unpleasant to be confronted with our own
death. A tax credit could be the ideal nudge that changes
behaviour in a direction that most people welcome; it might
help us to act in the way we think, reﬂectively, we should. So in
this sense a tax credit would actually support most people’s
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autonomy. Admittedly, such studies may to some extent
misrepresent people’s attitudes. After all, when faced with
a moral question some people feel the need to give a so-called
‘correct moral’ answer that may not correspond with what they
truly want to do. Yet, such surveys are not without value. First,
presumably not all anonymous respondents who would not
donate their organs are reluctant to give true but ‘morally
incorrect’ answers. Second, given that up to 80% respond that
they want to donate organs, the misrepresentation would have
to be massive for the conclusion that a majority of the popu-
lation wants to become organ donors when dead to be false.
Third, considerations of fairness appear to support a tax credit
scheme in two ways at least. Compensating people who do
something gooddfor example, creating tax incentives to
encourage people to donate money to charitydis a well-known
practice and is considered by many people to be both legally and
morally desirable because it increases the total amount of money
donated.17 Why not use tax credits to save the lives of people
who need an organ then? People who endorse tax beneﬁts for
donations to charity should at least explain why people who are
willing to donate their organs after death should not receive
a tax credit when those who donate money to charity receive
beneﬁcial treatment from the taxman. After all, the former,
unlike the latter, seems to involve psychological costs. Further-
more, on top of the unfairness in the differential treatment of
organ donors relative to other donors it also seems unfair that
everybody other than the donor receives something when organs
are transplanted.12 13 The medical staff and the medical ﬁrms all
receive ﬁnancial compensation for their work, and for the
medicine required to make the organ transplant a success; they
are not expected to offer their services for free. The recipient of
the organ, or donee, will have his or her life prolonged, and
relatives will beneﬁt by not losing a loved one.
Fourth, considerations of distributive justice will favour a tax
credit scheme, when the extra organs made available are used
mostly to help disadvantaged patients. We offer two illustra-
tions. To begin with, assume justice has a ‘sufﬁcientarian’
component; in other words, that people have a right to a mini-
mally ﬂourishing life.20 While this notion may be somewhat
vague, it is clear that, if it has any bite all, a young person in
immediate, unmet need of a new organ does not yet have his or
her right to a minimally ﬂourishing life satisﬁed. If, alternatively,
we think of justice in terms of equal opportunities for welfare, it
would seem similarly reasonable to suppose that making organs
available to people who need themdmany of whom will be
young, and will have lived for many years with a reduced quality
of life as a result, say, of their kidney problemsdwill reduce
inequality of opportunity for welfare.20
Finally, of course some people reject the idea of distributive
justice, in part because they think it involves asserting that some
people own others, in their persons and their labour, and that
this conﬂicts with the idea that people own themselves, ie, the
self-ownership thesis.21 22 However, even self-ownership is
compatible with our proposal. According to the self-ownership
thesis people own their own bodies and are free to dispose of
them in whatever way they see ﬁt (provided they do not use
them in ways violating the rights of others). Conﬁscating
people’s organs, certainly, would violate their self-ownership
rights. (The need to obtain the patient’s consent in the context
of surgical interventions is often explained in terms of the
patient’s self-ownership of his or her body.) However, offering
them a sum of money to consent to the use of their organs after
their death does not. Indeed, preventing them from so
consenting would violate their self-ownership.
This concludes our presentation of ﬁve arguments for the
view that voluntary organ donation should be recognised in tax
credits. We believe it is pretty indisputable: (1) that there is
a strong case in favour of a tax credit scheme of the sort we have
described; (2) that this case is robust across a wide range of
ethical principles; and (3) that the real issue is thus whether
there are any powerful objections to such a scheme. In what
follows we therefore present and evaluate eight objections.
Broadly speaking, two types of objection can be made: one
alleges that the tax credit mechanism goes too far, the other that
it does not go far enough (eg, because the organs of the deceased
should be considered a common resource capable of being
conﬁscated by the state without consent or compensation).23
We will ignore the latter. The objections of the ﬁrst type that we
consider do not exhaust the possibilities, but we think these are
the ones that will be (and most often are) employed against tax
incentives or other kinds of economic inducement to donate
organs.
EIGHT WORRIES
The no-effect and counterproductiveness objection
One worry about the proposal is that, despite expectations, it
might fail to induce more people to opt in to donation schemes.
This is the no-effect objection. Ultimately, the question of how
effectively tax credits affect the number of organs available for
transplantation is empirical. Only implementation and review
can reveal if more people will sign up as organ donors with the
scheme in place.
We make three observations about the no-effect objection.
First, at least some studies suggest that the offer of a fairly
modest cash payment would increase the number of people
willing to donate.24 Second, the no-effect objection gives us no
reason not to trial a tax credit scheme and assesses its effects.
True, it might show that the welfare argument for the scheme
does not apply, but it does not offer any reasons against the
scheme. Third, the arguments from fairness and self-ownership
stand even if tax credits fail to raise the number of donors.
A more serious concern about the tax scheme is that it may
actually reduce the number of people who are willing to donate
organs. This is the counterproductiveness objection. It would
present a serious challenge to the tax credit scheme if it were
correct. Part of our response above, however, namely that the
arguments from fairness and self-ownership stand, also applies
to the counterproductiveness objection. Moreover, as a tax credit
scheme would appear, in commonsense terms, to make organ
donation more, not less, attractive, a strong argument would be
needed to support the counterproductiveness objection. In
general, tax incentives strengthen the pattern of behaviour they
render more ﬁnancially attractive. Why should organ donation
be any different in this respect? Finally, few who oppose our
scheme are likely to press this particular objection. In point of
fact, some of the objections we discuss below, such as the
exploitation objection, presuppose that ﬁnancial incentives
increase public willingness to donate organs.
Titmuss’ objection
It might be suggested that the counterproductiveness objection
gains support from Richard M. Titmuss’ parallel objection to
payments for blood donations. His objection is empirically
based. It is alleged that paying for blood changes the social
meaning of giving blood, and that this may result in reduced
donations. The change in the social meaning, according to
Titmuss, comes about because ﬁnancial incentives to donate
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organs deny individuals the chance of entering into a gift rela-
tionship with those who need organs. This is problematical,
according to Titmuss, because: ‘The social relations set up by
gift exchanges are among the most powerful forces which bind
a social group together.’ Therefore, governments should: ‘.
weaken market forces which put men in positions where they
have little opportunity to make moral choices or to behave
altruistically if they wish so’.25 In keeping with this reasoning,
a tax credit for organ donation could (1) ensure that such
donation is no longer seen as a pure gift. In doing so it would
give potential donors less opportunity to make a moral choice,
ie, deprive them of a valuable option. This (2) would undermine
social cohesion and (3) could erode public willingness to donate.
If all this is true, our proposal certainly appears to be prob-
lematical. However, it is less clear which, if any, of the argu-
ments we offered in the previous section the Titmuss objection
defeats. Of course, to be an objection, it need not defeat any of
these arguments. It may simply point to objectionable features
of our scheme that are independent of the reasons so far adduced
in its favour.
Howsoever that may be, we are sceptical about claims (1) and
(2). First of all, we should note that we give gifts, according to
Titmuss, because we have a social and biological urge to help
people in need.25 However, if, collectively, we can help more
people in need by offering the donor a tax credit, this seems to be
the right thing to do in order to satisfy the urge to help people in
need. The important thing must be to save people from dying,
and from a moral point of view it is less important whether
people are able to make gifts. At a reﬂective level we should be
capable of understanding that this is the right way to satisfy our
urge to give.
Second, presumably a society is strengthened Titmuss-style
not by the sheer opportunity for citizens to make moral choices,
but by the fact that people exercise this opportunity. If so,
society might be strengthened under a tax break system, in
which, out of mixed or purely ﬁnancial motives, more people
make a better moral choice by being willing to donate than
under a system without tax breaks in which, out of purely non-
ﬁnancial motives, fewer people choose to donate. This is espe-
cially so given that the ﬁrst option saves lives and the second
involves letting people die. In any case, tax credits need not be
compulsory; within our scheme, people could retain the option
of donating their organs without receiving anything in return, or
they could give the equivalent of the monetary value of their tax
break to charity. In fact, was one to donate and receive a tax
credit, even though one would have donated whether or not
a credit was on offer, one would still be acting in an altruistic
spirit of the kind Titmuss values.23 In all societies sex is offered
for money, but that, it seems, does not prevent people from
engaging in acts of sex with a very different social meaning from
that which standard market transactions make possible. Why,
one may ask, cannot the same be true of donations of organs?
Third, although it is not a gift in the ordinary sense of the
worddthat is to say, it involves compensation for the ‘giving’
and a mere consent to give (and in most situations you will not
end up giving anything, ie, your organs will not be useful for
transplantation purposes)dorgan donation is clearly something
of very great importance to the receiver and his or her relatives
and friends. On the other hand, if we accept that donated organs
should be gifts, and that they are not gifts once you stand to
receive a tax credit for your willingness to donate, it can still be
claimed that it is more important to prevent people from dying
than it is to ensure that organ donation is a form of gifting. Note
also that Titmuss will need to conﬁne his point. Certainly one
wonders: why is it that organs must be given without any
return, while the services of doctors who carry out the trans-
plantations need not be? The Titmuss objection seems to prove
too much. As Cécile Fabre has said, it seems to show that
‘taxation should be voluntary’23 (p. 64).
Finally, without stretching matters too much, we believe, tax
credits can themselves be interpreted as giftsdfrom the state to
individuals who have done something for the common good. If
this is correct, tax credits may serve to increase the number of
gift relations in society. That ought to please those looking at
the issues in the way Titmuss recommends. Moreover, it is
unclear why a tax break will prevent organ donation itself from
being seen as a gift, especially if the tax credit is simply thought
to compensate the donor for the costs he or she has incurred.
Certainly, tax breaks for ordinary donations to charity have not
changed their meaning such that they are no longer thought of
as gifts.
Exploitation
Some may object that tax beneﬁts are more attractive to less
afﬂuent people than they are to those who are well off, and that
this might well lead to the exploitation of people in lower
income brackets.
This is not a convincing argument, for several reasons. First, it
is not clear what is meant by the term ‘exploitation’, and that
needs to be settled in order to assess the objection. One way, out
of many, to deﬁne ‘exploitation’ is to say that X exploits Y, if
(1) X makes use of the fact that Y is vulnerable in some respect
to make (eg, by coercing) Yact in a certain way, and (2) Y would
have been better off had X not acted in this way,26 27 but is tax
redit-backed organ donation necessarily a case of exploitation on
this deﬁnition? It seems not. Let us suppose that poor people are
more likely to accept a tax credit for their willingness to donate
than those who are well off. As long as the poor can beneﬁt from
the arrangement, and make an informed and voluntary choice
that helps others in need, it is difﬁcult to view our proposal as
exploitative. The concern about exploitation of the poor is
further guarded against by the fact that the tax credits at issue
(of £200 per annum) would probably not enrich anyone sufﬁ-
ciently to coerce them into making a decision that they would
not otherwise make. The credits would merely beneﬁt them
ﬁnancially. Furthermore, and very importantly, if one is worried
about exploitation, and if it is true that poor people have more
organ failures than rich people, then the poor would beneﬁt even
more than the well off from a system of donation-linked tax
credits. Finally, and most importantly, because one does not need
one’s organs after death, it is unclear that poor people are
vulnerable in some respect (other than that they need money
more than others) that the state takes advantage of when it
offers a tax credits for postmortem donationsdunless, of course,
one thinks that poor people are exploited whenever they are
offered money in exchange for something. Premortem donations
are a different matter, of course, but these are not recommended
in our proposal. It might plausibly be objected that, on the
present deﬁnition, third-world sweatshops are not exploitative
provided the workers’ only alternative is unemployment, in
which case they would be even worse off. To accommodate this
intuition, one could omit (2) from the deﬁnition of exploitation.
Note, however, that even so revised the deﬁnition of exploita-
tion does not rule out the possibility that tax breaks for organ
donations might be non-exploitative, for example, if only
persons deemed non-vulnerable are eligible for the tax break.
However, our proposal might involve exploitation on a different
deﬁnition of exploitation, for example, one according to which it
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is sufﬁcient for exploitation that (1) above holds and (3) that X
(or others) beneﬁt much more from X’s action than Y.
In any case, even if the exploitation worry applies and one
should be worried by the exploitation of poor people in devel-
oping countries when it comes to organ donation, one should
nevertheless welcome a ﬁnancial incentive in afﬂuent countries.
For reduced waiting lists in rich countries would, as we have
argued, have the knock-on effect that fewer people in poor
countries are exposed to the alleged exploitation involved in
organ tourism, and that fewer people are exploited by organ
theft. Also, insofar as a tax credit scheme involves the exploi-
tation of relatively poor people in wealthy countries, presum-
ably, this exploitation is less worrying than the worse
exploitation that occurs when desperately poor people sell
their organs on the black market. Obviously, deontologists who
think that we should not exploit people through the state
even when that will reduce the overall scale of exploitation
will not be impressed by this point. At least it shows that
a concern for exploitation in relation to organs may take such
a non-deontological form, in which it favours our proposal.
Commodification
Is a tax credit system of organ donation objectionable because it
involves the commodiﬁcation of human body parts and/or paves
the way to the commodiﬁcation of human body parts? There
are many ways to interpret this concern. One has to do with the
possible harmful effects that such commodiﬁcation can have on
people’s attitudes to one another. For instance, some might
worry that we would begin to view each other more as objects
than persons, each with goals of his or her own. Another worry
has to do with the idea that there is something wrong as such
with putting a price on one’s willingness to donatedthat this
violates individual dignity or the ‘sacred’ notion that all persons
are in some sense priceless.28 29
Tax credits do not entail commodiﬁcation in the standard
sense, which would indicate some kind of sale or market in
organs. The monetary value of a tax credit is ﬁxed, unlike the
payments made in a market. Again, unlike the situation in
a market, tax credits cannot be turned over to (traded with)
another person; they are linked to the speciﬁc tax proﬁle of each
person. Nor can the giver of the organ sell to the highest bidder
or for frivolous purposes. Indeed, the donor has no inﬂuence on
who receives the organ and the donee is not the highest bidder,
but the person in, say, the greater need. Many countries offer tax
credits, or premiums, to encourage people to have more children,
or charge people who adopt children a large fee, but no one
seriously thinks that children have been commodiﬁed by this;
the same goes for tax incentives encouraging donations to
charities (especially when these represent compensation for the
inconvenience involved for the donor).
Second, even if there were a genuine risk of commodiﬁcation
in a broad sense of that term, so long as the tax credit system
increased the supply of organs, the volume of organ tourism
would be reduced, and in this way the number of commodifying
transactions would decrease. So, once again, if one objects to our
proposal on the grounds that it would increase immoral
commodiﬁcation, one should concede that there is a strong
reason in its favourdnamely, that it would probably limit organ
tourism and the black market for organs that exists in some
countries.
Third, even if tax credits are a form of commodiﬁcation, the
system of organ donation they play a role in may not necessarily
be morally impermissible all things considered. We already
accept ﬁnancial compensation (reimbursement for lost income
and travel expenses) for sperm and egg donation. So, our argu-
ment goes, if we can save the lives of thousands of people by
means of organ donation-linked tax credits the concern for
commodiﬁcation should not outweigh these lives. Here one
could argue, as some scholars do, that one can perfectly well
favour the reimbursement of funeral expenses to the relatives of
organ donors, but oppose tax credits rewarding willingness to
donate organs.2 The scholars we have in mind here believe that
only the former is intended as an expression of society’s
appreciation of the donation. That is the difference, but the
problem with this standpoint is to explain why a tax beneﬁt
could not be intended to express society ’s appreciation of
people’s willingness to help.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between persons and
their bodies. In our view, personal identity is constituted by
psychological continuity of the right sort. This continuity may
obtain independently of the continuity of all of a person’s
organs, with the possible exception of the brain. Accordingly,
using someone’s body (his or her brain excepted) as
a commodity need not involve using him or her as a commodity.
Therefore, objections to the commodiﬁcation of persons do not
automatically read across to the commodiﬁcation of trans-
plantable body parts.
Inequality and unequal status
It might be complained that the beneﬁt of the tax credit
system would be unfair as not everybody would have the
opportunity to receive the credits. Some peopledthe obvious
case would be the elderly, but there are also people with weak
or damaged internal organsdsimply do not have organs of the
kind transplant surgery requires. However, nothing we have
said so far indicates that the basis for tax deduction is not
simply agreeing to donate as opposed to agreeing to donate
organs that, as a matter of fact, are not substandard. Two
reasons speak in favour of the former. First, the administrative
burden may be very heavy if every person who signs up is
required somehow to demonstrate that his or her organs are of
adequate quality for transplantation. Second, most people
have at least some organs that can be used even if some
cannot. In any case, if there is reason to expect a signiﬁcant
amount of free-riding that would at most motivate adopting
a particular version of our proposal, for example, one in which
people with substandard organs cannot receive a tax deduction
even if they signed up perhaps not knowing their organs were
substandard.
Is this unjust? True, the individuals unable to beneﬁt from
a tax credit will often be elderly or people (such as patients with
cancer, or active alcohol abusers) whose organs are in such a bad
state that they are not suitable for donation. These people will
probably care more about their own increased chance of survival
when the tax credit system is introduced than they would about
being denied a small tax beneﬁt. (Admittedly, this increase
might not be great as many elderly people and people with
serious illnesses are not eligible recipients of organs as they are
unlikely to survive transplantation surgery.) So although our
proposal might create an inequality speciﬁcally in tax credits
linked to organ donation, it might well decrease inequalities of
longevity. Surely the latter is more important. From an ex ante
perspective our scheme would probably reduce overall
inequality.
A different, and slightly less tangible, worry is that it would
be primarily poor people who sign up as donors, and this would
have a symbolic signiﬁcance that clashes with the idea of citi-
zens relating to one another as equals.30e32 This worry itself is
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not an objection to tax incentives as such; it will not apply if
there is no signiﬁcant difference in the willingness of different
income groups to donate, and to some extent whether there is
might be affected through campaigns targeting particular under-
donating groups. Finally, the present objection may apply to
schemes not involving any, let alone monetary, advantages of
donating if rich donors are drastically underrepresented and poor
donors drastically overrepresented.
Better alternatives
Some might reject our scheme on the grounds that there are
better ways to increase the number of organs available for
donation. For example, medical staff could be better trained to
detect and make use of the organs that are available. Or one
could retrieve organs from people who are not brain dead, but
who are in an irreversible coma in an intensive care unit with
a respirator connected, when the staff and the relatives have
decided to allow the person to die because his or her best
interests are no longer served by prolonged life; for example,
patients in a persistent vegetative state.33
It is true that there are other means of increasing the available
pool of organs (just as there may be ways of reducing demand
for organs, such as by introducing policies designed to curb
alcoholism or obesity). What this shows is that the tax credit
system whose beneﬁts we are trying to describe should be
viewed as a supplement to, not a substitute for, other ways of
aligning organ demand and supply.
Expense
One pragmatic worry is that, for the tax credit scheme to be
effective, the credits would need to be offered on such a huge
scale that it would simply be too expensive. Imagine two million
people in, say, the UK each receiving a tax credit of £200. Given
a 50% marginal taxation rate, this would equate to a loss of
income tax to the state of approximately £200 million per
annum.
This is an awful lot of money, certainly, but it is not clear that
it is too much. If, for example, 2 million extra people signed up
as organ donors in the UK we could expect the number of people
saved by organ donation to be increased. First, the connected
increase in the number of organs available for donation might
mean that approximately 300 extra lives could be saved annually
(assuming that if 18 367 673 registered people accumulates 3000
donations in a year, then a 10% increase in the number of people
registered should accumulate a 10% increase in the number of
people receiving an organ).34 Second, according to the directive
of the European parliament and of the Council on Standards of
Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for Trans-
plantation: ‘Organ transplantation is now the most cost-effec-
tive treatment for end-stage renal failure and the only available,
life saving treatment for end-stage failure of organs such as liver,
lung and heart.’ According to another study the economic
beneﬁts of the average kidney transplant with an anticipated
half-life of at least 10 years is well over £300 000. So while our
scheme is costly, the scheme should ensure that costs elsewhere
in the healthcare system, such as the set-up and running costs of
dialysis, are signiﬁcantly reduced. Finally, the greater availability
of organs for transplantation will result in improved quality of
life for more donees and their relatives.
Another worry when it comes to ﬁnancial incentives for organ
donation and which is somehow related to expense (but also
inequality), is the problem of free-riding.35 36 If there are too
many people who would receive the tax beneﬁt knowing that
they (1) would not be able to donate (eg, because they have
a certain condition that renders their organs unsuitable for
donation) or (2) because they instruct their families to refuse
donation after their death, our proposal could indeed be cost
ineffective. Although free-riding cannot be ruled out, the bene-
ﬁts of the proposal might, all things considered, outweigh the
social costs of free-riding. The problem with the latter type of
free-riding, ie, (2), we deal with in the next section.
Concerns about vetoing by relatives
Finally, it might be insisted that relatives should be able to veto
transplantation of a dead person’s organs, and that, in practice,
this will be impossible under our scheme if the deceased person
has already received and spent the money he was granted as
a tax credit.
How serious is this problem? First, we believe any such
insistence is misguided; relatives should not have a veto in such
cases; it is more important to save lives than it is to allow
families a veto over organ disposal. From an impartial point of
view, it is morally more important to save the life of someone
than to make sure that relatives can, for example, say goodbye
to a deceased family member in a speciﬁc and organ donation
incompatible way. Second, the person whose organs are being
donated has consented to donate his or her organs; allowing
relatives to veto this decision is incompatible with the right to
determine what happens to one’s own body. Finally, if these
considerations are inconclusive and there is a case for giving
relatives a veto, one can modify our proposal to accommodate
thisdfor example, by allowing relatives to veto donation
provided that the tax credits are paid back to the state, perhaps
from funds in the estate of the deceased. On this proposal both
the donor and his or her family will enjoy a veto right over
donation.
CONCLUSION
We have presented ﬁve arguments for the view that the value of
voluntary organ donation should be recognised in tax credits. We
submit: (1) that a strong case can be made for a tax credit
scheme of the sort we have described; (2) that this case is robust
across a wide range of ethical principles; and (3) that there are no
really telling objections to such a scheme. These claims, if
correct, point to the conclusion that our proposal should be
trialled, at the very least.
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